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1 Introduction
This paper examines how institutions designed for enforcing competition in markets affect
economic performance. A central role of the state in building a market economy is to guar-
antee that there are benefits of competition to ensure static and dynamic efficiency. But the
way that this is done varies across sectors of the economy. Those sectors that are subject
to international competition have natural exposure to competition if trade is liberalized,
while those that are not are more dependent on domestic policies that encourage entry and
limit the abuse of market power.
The core empirical implication that we explore here, is that the institutions that affect
competition policy should have a heterogenous effect on tradable and non-tradable sectors.
To investigate this, we require firm-level data. Hence, we have assembled a dataset of 10
million firms covering 20 sectors across 90 countries over a period of 10 years (2006-
2015) based on Orbis (2016). To measure antitrust policy, we exploit the Total Scope
Index Score constructed by Hylton and Deng (2007) which is based on assessments of
competition law made by legal experts and practitioners. This is available for a wide
variety of countries/economies.
Our core findings exploit variation in antitrust both across and within different sectors
and countries. Using the Orbis profitability measure, we show that profitability is related
to an index of antitrust policy but only in non-tradable sectors. The results that we present
are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.
Our baseline results are based on a cross-country and cross-sector analysis where we
show evidence of systematic heterogeneity in the relationship between antitrust policies
and firm outcomes. We show that, in countries with stronger antitrust policies, the profit
margins of firms operating in non-tradable sectors are significantly lower than those oper-
ating in tradable sectors. The results are economically meaningful suggesting, for example,
that if China adopted France’s antitrust index, we would expect a 19% fall in the average
profit margin. We also find that concentration is lower in non-tradable sectors when an-
titrust policy is strong. In contrast, changes in antitrust are associated with negligible
effects on tradable sectors, in line with the hypothesis that international markets serves to
discipline firms in such sectors.
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These findings underline the limits of trade liberalization as a means of promoting
competition since, in our sample, about 82% of firms operate in non-tradable sectors.
So, without rigorous competition policy, there may be limited scope to introduce more
competition into important sectors such as wholesale, retail, transportation, construction,
and real estate.
Our results are consistent with the idea that institutions matter, in the form of compe-
tition law and enforcement, for sectors of the economy where international competition
is weak. Moreover, the finding in our paper is specific to the antitrust measures; other
measures of “good institutions” do not appear correlated with profitability in the non-
tradable sectors of the economy. It therefore adds a new dimension to debates about how
a strong institutional environment can be conducive to growth and development beyond
the previous focus on such things as lowering the threat of expropriation (La Porta et al.,
1998), minimizing rent extraction (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or securing legal protection and
infrastructure (Besley and Persson, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
literature. In section 3, we present the conceptual framework that motivates the test that
we use. Section 4 presents the data and section 5 presents the core empirical results.
In section 6, we discuss a key concern about interpreting the results along with some
robustness checks. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The paper is related to an emerging body of literature on antitrust policy and its conse-
quences. Our findings complement recent work studying the role of antitrust and firm
margins in the United States (Gutie´rrez and Philippon, 2017, De Loecker et al., 2020), that
we extend to additional countries and across sectors with different degrees of tradability.
Debates about the role of antitrust and its ability to affect firm behavior are long-standing.
Block et al. (1981) show that antitrust efforts and penalties generate a deterrent effect
on cartels, that lead firms to set a price between the competitive the oligopolistic price.
Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) find that the profitability and concentration of US indus-
tries increased in the past two decades due to decreasing domestic competition, in line with
Grullon et al. (2019). These results are consistent with our antitrust measure showing a
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decline in the stringency of antitrust policies in the United States, as highlighted by Faccio
and Zingales (2017) for the telecommunication sector.
Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) study the increase in competitiveness in Europe, show-
ing that increased antitrust enforcement has led to lower concentration and profits, without
negative effects on innovation. Alfaro et al. (2016) show that higher prices in the prod-
uct market induce more integration, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation induced by
trade policies. This result is in line with our findings on declines in both firm profits and
concentration as antitrust policy intensifies.
The paper also relates to the large literature on the impact of trade liberalization by
showing that antitrust policies may help to offset the absence of external competition for
non-tradable sectors.Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) study how imperfect competition and
scale economies affect the size and scope of trade liberalization. Pavcnik (2012) investi-
gates the effects of trade liberalization on plant productivity in Chile and finds evidence
of within plant productivity improvements, leading to higher aggregate productivity, in
line with Krishna and Mitra (1998) in India and Amiti and Konings (2007) in Indonesia.
Bernard et al. (2011) offer a general equilibrium model of multiple-product, multiple-
destination firms, with heterogeneity in productivity across firms as well as product at-
tributes within firms. This illustrates the heterogeneous effects of trade liberalization
across countries, across and within firms. Using a structural model and matched plant-
product data, De Loecker (2011) shows that the gains from trade liberalization are sub-
stantially smaller than previously estimated.
While there is a large and growing literature on the impact of trade liberalization on
tradable sectors, much less is known about non-tradables. Among the prominent con-
tributions in this smaller field, Goldstein et al. (1980) develop and estimate a general
import function with tradable and non-tradable goods, finding a marginal role for non-
tradable goods. Xu (2003) examines how trade liberalization can affect the boundary
between tradable and non-tradable goods, leading firms to switch the tradability of their
products. Rodrik et al. (2004) estimate the contributions of institutions, geography, and
trade in determining income levels, finding that institutional measures are key, particularly
in codetermining trade patterns. Finally, Kovak (2013) develops a specific-factors model
of regional economies showing that prices of non-tradable goods and services move in line
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with tradable goods prices following liberalization.
Finally, the paper is related to a large literature on the benefits of competition for con-
sumers (see Vickers, 1995 for an overview). In static models, these typically come from
driving prices closer to marginal cost while, in dynamic models, there is a role for com-
petition in encouraging the development and adoption of cost-reducing technologies and
also in product innovation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2001). There is an increasing realization that
the benefits of competition has not been emphasised sufficiently in the design of develop-
ment strategies, where incumbents often enjoy unchecked market power (see, for example,
UNCTAD, 2008).
3 Empirical Hypotheses
The paper tests two hypotheses relating antitrust policies and profitability. Equilibrium
profit margins depend on ex-post price competition, entry and exit, all of which are af-
fected by competition policy in general and antitrust policy in particular. While there is a
range of potential models that could be used to motivate this, many make ambiguous pre-
dictions about the relationship between competition and profitability once entry and exit
are allowed, especially when firms are heterogenous (see, for example, Syverson (2019)
and Covarrubias et al. (2019)).
Effective antitrust institutions try to regulate market conduct by powerful firms through
faciltating entry of new and more efficient firms, thereby benefitting consumers directly.
This will creates which tend to lower prices and profits. Firms that face international
competition through imports face additional pressure on prices and profitability that non-
tradable firms do not get exposed to.1 This yields:
Prediction 1 All else equal, profit margins will tend to be higher in non-tradable indus-
tries.
Our second hypothesis makes a stronger claim that we should observe a stronger
marginal effect from an improvement in antristrust institutions in non-tradable sectors,
i.e.,
1Although domestic regulators might also have a say about mergers of foreign firms if they operate in
domestic markets, this is likely to be hard to detect in the data.
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Prediction 2 Strengthening antitrust policies will tend to lower profit margins in non-
tradable industries more than in tradable industries.
Although we regard this as plausible given that competition is likely to be weaker
in non-tradable goods sectors, it is not a direct implication of some models. There are
direct effects of antritrust policies on prices that will tend to have a higher marginal impact
where competition is weaker as we would expect in non-tradable sectors. But things are
somewhat less clear cut in models where antitrust policy affects entry and exit.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether we find a relationship between antitrust
policies and profit margins which is stronger in non-tradable sectors. This is what we
explore for the remainder of the paper.
4 Data
In this section, we describe core features of the data; Online Appendix A fills in the details.
Our core sample is based on the universe of firms contained in Orbis (Bureau van Dijk,
BvD) from 2006 to 2015.2 The dataset contains each firm registered and reports financial
statements.3 Each firm in the data is assigned to a sector using the reported NACE Rev. 2
section code.
We will differentiate between whether a firm operates in a tradable or a non-tradable
sector. In the baseline, tradable sectors are Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A), Mining
and quarrying (B) and Manufacturing (C). All other sectors are labelled as non-tradable.
As a robustness check, we follow Mian and Sufi (2014), and include Information and
communication (J) among the tradable sectors.4
Profitability Our core variable is the firm-specific profit margin according to the Orbis
Handbook defined as the Profit/Loss before Tax and External Items over Operating Rev-
enue (times 100).5 The main analysis uses the average profit margin of all firms in the
2In 2015 there are only 109,043 firms with a non-missing observation for the profit margin. In all other
years there are at least 5.5 million. (The results are robust to dropping 2015 completely, see Column 5,
Appendix Table D.5.)
3It is not possible to distinguish firms going out of business from firms simply not reporting data
4We excluded the sector “Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies (U)” altogether.
5Profit/Loss before Tax and External items is the sum of Operating Profit (which is equal to Gross Profit,
i.e. Operating Revenue minus Costs of Goods Sold including any interest payments on this, minus Other Op-
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country-sector after having computed the average profit margin for each firm over the ten
year period. We trim the top/bottom 1% of the firms to account for reporting errors, and
in a robustness check we also trim at the top/bottom 5% of the country-sector cells, see
Appendix Table D.8.6 The core sample is defined for 20 sectors and 94 countries con-
taining over 12 million firms of which about 10 million are classified as operating in a
non-tradable sector.
To ensure the concentration measures are representative of the country-sector firm
composition, we impose a minimum number of firms with relevant data for the country-
sector to be included in the data. The usual cutoff that we use is 20 firms in a country-sector
but as a robustness check, we will vary this cutoff from 0 (i.e., no restriction at all) to 3000
firms per country-sector.7
As an alternative way of aggregating data, we compute each concentration measure
at country-sector-year level and then we take the average of these concentration measures
over the ten years that we study (we will use the label Average to refer to the concentration
measures computed in this way). To assess robustness, we will also look at year-by-year
results.8 We also compute a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on Total Assets and
Gross or Net Sales for each country-sector: Even though it is less theoretically sound, we
regard the HHI-based Total Assets as better measured since sales are missing for many
more firms.9
The Antitrust Measure To measure antitrust policy at a country level, we use the Total
Scope Index Score (Scope Index) from Hylton and Deng (2007).10 They code antitrust
erating Expenses) and Loss with Financial Profit/Loss (which is equal to Financial Revenue minus Financial
Expenses).
6Trimming is performed at country-sector level after having computed the average profit margin over the
ten years period for each firm.
7This means that we need at least 20 firms to have at least one financial statement in the data over the ten
year period.
8We include only those country-sectors where the number of observations is greater than or equal to the
cutoff based on the average number of firms used to compute the yearly concentration measures.
9We have also experimented with predicting gross (or net) sales using total assets, i.e. regressing gross
sales on total assets, sector fixed effects and the interaction term at country-year level (or at country level
when we predict values of averages over ten years). We then used imputed values where the sales variable
is missing (with negative values excluded).
10The most recent version of the dataset can be found here.
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laws and policies around the world (112 countries in the most recent version) in order
to have a metric for the strength of antitrust laws. The authors examine the effects of
various components of competition law and assign a score depending how the national law
specifies procedures, penalties, and enforcement.11 The total index score is the sum of the
scores for each category as elaborated further in Hylton and Deng (2007). The minimum
possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30. For our analysis, it is important to
point out that it is principally (if not exclusively) a de jure index; it has no direct measure
of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in practice. Section II of Hylton and Deng (2007)
discusses the methodology extensively. 12 In the empirical analysis below, we average the
index over the ten year period of our data (2006-2015). We will also test the robustness of
the results to using the budget allocated to the antitrust regulator using data from Bradford
et al. (2019).
The highest value of the index is for France with a score of 26 while the US has a value
of 24. China (20) scores below the median value while Mexico (23) and India (22) sit just
above and below the median respectively. We show in the Appendix that the antitrust
index is correlated in a common sense way with a range of variables which represent the
quality of institutions.13 Although these are not causal connections, they suggest that there
are important sources of country-level unobserved heterogeneity that probably affect the
11Categories considered: Territorial Scope, Remedies, Private Enforcement, Merger Notification, Merger
Assessment, Dominance, and Restrictive Trade Practices.
12A special case is represented by Europe. Hylton and Deng (2007) present both regulation from the
European Commission and for each country member of the EU, reporting the national antitrust law and
the national antitrust law integrated with EU regulation. We consider measures of European-wide Antitrust
policies in Appendix Table D.5, in which we consider the European Union to a single country with similar
results to our baseline specification.
13Specifically, we run the following regression:
Ac = α+ χZc + εc
where Ac is the Total Scope Index Score of Hylton and Deng (2007) and Zc can be any of the following: the
log of GDP per capita, the Economic Freedom, Civil Liberties and Political Rights Indices from Freedom
House, the democracy and executive constraints measures from PolityIV and the Rule of Law Index from the
World Justice Project. The results in Table C.2 show that countries with higher GDP have a better antitrust
regime on average using the measure from Hylton and Deng (2007). The index is positively correlated
with economic freedom but negatively correlated with political and civil rights. Countries that are more
democratic and have stronger executive constraints also have higher scores on the antitrust index; stronger
rule of law is also positively correlated with the index.
8
antitrust regime, thereby reinforcing the need to include country fixed effects in all our
regressions. We will return to this when we evaluate whether it is the antitrust index or
some more generalized measures of ”good” institutions that is driving the results.
Summary Statistics Summary statistics on the distribution of profitability, concentra-
tion, and the antitrust index are given in Table 1. This shows how these variables vary
within countries, across sectors and across countries within sectors.
Panel A gives the average profit margin both overall and disaggregated using our
tradable/non-tradable distinction. The average profit margin in non-tradable sectors is
higher with a mean of 7.58 (standard deviation 9.47) when compared to the tradable sec-
tors with a mean of 5.18 (standard deviation 6.63). These descriptive statistics are consis-
tent with Hypothesis 1 based on the assumption that tradable sectors are, on average, more
exposed to international trade. The between-country variation is somewhat greater than
the within-country variation, thereby suggesting that country-specific factors are at work
in determining these differences. Panel B shows that the HHI measure is also higher on av-
erage for the non-tradable sectors. It is 4.87 (standard deviation 9.02) for the non-tradable
sectors while for the tradable sectors it is 4.03 (standard deviation 8.83).
In Panel C, we give the fraction of country-sectors in our sample that are classified
as tradable according to our baseline definition and that used in Mian and Sufi (2014).
Our definition suggests that 17% of country-sector observations are in the tradables sector
while using the Mian and Sufi (2014) definition, it is 22%. Summary statistics in Table
2 are consistent with our sample being composed of 10.5 million firms operating in the
non-tradable sector out of a total of 12.8 millions firms. It means that tradable sectors
represents 17.9% (21.8% using the Mian and Sufi (2014) definition) of our sample. We
conclude that most firms are not exposed to international trade and that looking at the
competitive impact of trade therefore gives only a partial picture of factors driving firm
performance and profitability.
Finally, in Panel D, we report the means and standard deviations of our two core an-
titrust variables. The wide range of differences in the expenditure measure is particularly
striking.
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5 Core Results
In this section, we outline the main approach taken and core results.
Empirical Approach Let Pcs be a core profitability or concentration measure in country
c and sector s. Then our core regression specification is as follows:
Pcs = δc + δs + β1 [Ac ×Ns] + β2Ns + β3Ac + εcs (1)
where δc are country fixed effects, δs are sector fixed effects, Ac is the antitrust index and
Ns is dummy variable which is equal to one if a sector is classified as non-tradable. Pcs
and Ac of these variables are averaged within-countries using all data between 2006 and
2015.14 The standard errors are clustered at country level.15 The inclusion of country fixed
effects absorbs the general background variation due to different economic and political
circumstances affecting the environment in which firms operate. And sector fixed effects
account for technology and other fixed differences at that level.
A test of Hypothesis 1 is whether β2 > 0, i.e. profit margins are higher in non-
tradable sectors due to the absence of foreign competition. However, this coefficient can
be estimated only when we exclude sector fixed effects. Nonetheless, we will report what
the data say in that case. Similarly, we cannot estimate β3 when we include country fixed
effects from (1). But when we exclude them, as we do in one of our specifications below,
we expect to find that β3 < 0.
Hypothesis 2 says that we should have β1 < 0 i.e. the antitrust measure matters only
for non-tradable sectors. Our most demanding test of Hypothesis 2 is where both country
and sector fixed effects are included.
Results Table 2 reports the core results.
Column (1) excludes sector fixed effects and finds, in line with Hypothesis 1, that
non-tradable sectors tend to have higher profit rates reflecting what we found in the raw
14In the robustness check section we repeat the analysis year-by-year.
15We have explored alternative clustering of standard errors at country-sector level, equivalent to the
Huber-White estimator, and unadjusted standard errors. We have also experimented with weighted regres-
sion using the number of firms in each country-sector as a weight. Our results are robust to these changes
alternative approaches. See Appendix Table D.8
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data and consistent with the hypothesis that they face weaker competition. In this case,
Hypothesis 2 also holds as we find that having a higher value of the antitrust index lowers
profit margins more strongly in non-tradable sectors.
Column (2) of Table 2 has sector fixed effects but no country fixed effects. There is
weak evidence that the antitrust measure is negatively correlated with profit margins. But,
once again, there is a stronger negative correlation between the antitrust measure and profit
margins in non-tradable sectors.
Column (3) has both country and sector fixed effects so constitutes our main specifica-
tion against which we will assess the robustness of our findings. Now, we have a negative
and significant estimate of β1 in line with Hypothesis 2. It indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in the antitrust index of a country is associated with a decline of 10.3
percent of a standard deviation in the profit margin of firms operating in a non-tradable
sector. This corresponds to an absolute decline in the profit margin of 0.88 points, corre-
sponding to 13% drop compared to the mean profit margin. Another way to look at this is
to suppose that if China, which has an index value of 20, moved to France’s score of 26
(1.45 times the standard deviation of the Scope Index) then it would lead to decrease in the
average profit margin of −0.103× 1.45× 8.53 = −1.27, which corresponds to a 19% fall
in the average profit margin given the sample average of 6.80. So the effect that we have
uncovered is economically meaningful.
In Column (4), we show that these findings hold up if we instead use the Mian and Sufi
(2014) definition of tradable sector, which reclassifies the Information and Communica-
tion sector as tradable along with Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. This classifies
nearly half a million firms in our sample as tradable. The key coefficient, β1, is some-
what larger in absolute magnitude. In Column (5), we use a measure of the expenditures
allocated for antitrust purposes instead of the antitrust index and the results are qualita-
tively similar. Finally, Column (6) use the asset-based HHI described above as the left
hand side variable. The coefficient β1 remains negative and significantly different from
zero, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in the antitrust index of a coun-
try is associated with the sector operating in a non-tradable sector of that country to be
less concentrated by 13.5 percent of a standard deviation. This implies an absolute de-
cline in the HHI of 1.22 points, corresponding to 27.2% drop relative to the mean level of
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concentration.16
Taken together, these results are supportive of both hypotheses suggested above. Profit
margins are higher in non-tradable sectors and, since tradable sectors face more discipline
from import competition, the antitrust policy environment matters most for non-tradable
sectors.
Sectoral Heterogeneity We have grouped the coefficients a priori based on whether the
sector is classified as tradable or non-tradable. As a reality check, we allow for a separate
relationship between the antitrust index and sector, i.e. we estimate
Pcs = δc + δs +
∑
non-tradable sectors
βs (δs × Ac) + εcs (2)
where βs is the sector specific correlation between the antitrust variable and our outcome
of interest. This allows us to assess whether it is the non-tradable sectors that are indeed
driving the result. We plot the coefficient βs for each of our 17 non-tradable sectors where
the interval gives the 95% confidence interval in Figure 1. The three tradable sectors
represent the reference group (Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining).
The first thing to note is that no sector has a positive and significant coefficient. Those
that have negative and significant coefficients are Transportation and Storage, Accom-
modation and Food Service, Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate. Electricity, Gas,
Steam and Air-conditioning, and Defence and Social Security are borderline significant.
When we test whether all coefficients are equal to each other, we reject the null hypothesis
(pvalue=0.001). As expected we also reject the null hypothesis that they are all equal to
zero at the same time (pvalue=0.0007).
6 Robustness
We now discuss two robustness checks; many others can be found in the online Appendix.
The first investigates whether it is the antitrust regime that matters rather than just “good”
institutions and the second looks at other ways of cutting the data.
16Appendix Table D.2 repeats the analysis using an HHI constructed with gross or net sales with similar
results.
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Antitrust or Other Country Characteristics? We show in Table C.2 that the antitrust
index is correlated with variables that we expect to reflect the economic and institutional
environment, specifically: the log of GDP per capita, the Economic Freedom, Civil Lib-
erties, and Political Rights Indices from Freedom House, the democracy and executive
constraints measures from PolityIV and the Rule of Law Index from the World Justice
Project.
This raises a possible concern that our results may be driven by these institutional
differences rather than the antitrust environment. To assess this, we take these institutional
variables and interact them, one by one, with the non-tradable dummy rather than the
antitrust index. Specifically we run:
Pcs = δc + δs + β1 [Zc ×Ns] + εcs (3)
where Zc are the variables from Table C.2. If it is the antitrust regime that our measure
is capturing then we should not expect to find any significant correlation between Zc and
lower profit margins in non-tradable sectors.
The results are in Table 3, which shows across the board that there is no significant
correlation between these other background economic and institutional variables, and a
lower profit margin in non-tradable sectors in spite of the fact that Table C.2 found them
to be strongly correlated with the index itself. We would particularly flag that this is true
for GPD per capita and democracy indicators. This suggests that our findings are indeed
driven by something specific to the antitrust environment as measured in Hylton and Deng
(2007).
Alternative Ways of Constructing the Data To stress test the data that we have and
their reliability, we now explore what happens when we try different rules for assembling
our profit margin data, different years, and splitting the sample across observations where
the measurement is likely to be more reliable. The results are in Table 4.
To include a country-sector in the data, we required that there were at least 20 observa-
tions in a cell. Columns (1) through (3) vary this. In Column (1), we drop any restriction
on cell size completely and the core finding is robust. Columns (2) and (3) become more
stringent for inclusion with 50 and 200 observations being needed for inclusion. The latter
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is particularly demanding for quite a few countries and the sample now falls from 94 coun-
tries to 63. Yet the results are robust. In Appendix Table D.3, we reports similar regression
results for various other cutoffs, finding results that are in line with Table 4.
We used the data averaged across all years between 2006 and 2015. In Columns (4),
(5) and (6) we pick three representative years (2007, 2011 and 2014) to show that size
and significance of the main coefficient of interest does not change. This happens despite
losing a few countries in each column compared to the full time period. In Appendix
Table D.4 and D.5 we provide results for each year separately as well as alternative ways
of aggregating data.17
Finally, we address the concern that our results could be driven by poor data quality in
some countries. Column (7) of Table 4 offers one important robustness check: it restricts
the sample to countries that have at least 19 sectors with sufficient data to be included
(where 20 is the maximum number of sectors possible). This serves as a check on data
quality since some countries have limited data coverage in Orbis that leads to the exclusion
of entire sectors. Our findings are not affected by imposing this restriction. In Appendix
Table D.7, we present other alternatives with similar conclusions.
7 Concluding Comments
This paper has explored a specific aspect of institutional quality, namely the strength of
de jure antitrust policy. For tradable goods, exposure to import competition serves as
a disciplining mechanism for firms, leading to lower profit margins. However, for non-
tradable goods, what firms do depends on how governments set the framework for and
implement competition policy. This is important since 82% of all firms in our data opreate
in non-tradable sectors and there is little scope for international competition to improve
their performance.
To explore this, we have built a global dataset based on Orbis and used an “off-the-
shelf” measure of antitrust policy constructed by legal scholars. We find that stronger
antitrust policy depresses profit margins but only in non-tradable sectors. This suggests
that competition policy is particularly important in parts of the economy that are not ex-
posed to import competition. This is particularly relevant given that we find that there is
17The only insignificant sub-sample is for 2015 for which we have a much smaller sample size.
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greater concentration in non-tradable sectors. Our data cover a range of diverse economies
including some low income and emerging market countries. This has pros and cons; data
quality is likely to be lower in less-developed parts of the world, but we benefit from
having more variation in the range of antitrust policies to learn from.
Although we find robust results for the measures that we use, we acknowledge that
antitrust is only one aspect of what matters in determining profitability and firm perfor-
mance. Moreover, even though we have ruled out the claim that our findings are simply
a reflection of “good institutions” in general, there are some aspects of competition policy
that we could be picking up since they may be correlated with the anitrust index that we
use, a prime example being the regulation of entry.18 Future work based on other specific
dimensions of policy would therefore be valuable.
The paper fits into wider debates about cross-country developments in competition
policy, in particular the respective roles of technology versus antitrust policies in shaping
profits.19 While our findings cannot adjudicate between these views, they do underline a
potential role for antitrust policies in explaining cross-country differences in profitability.
But it also suggests an interaction between this and how far a country is exposed to interna-
tional competition. Our results suggest that looking at the benefits of competition across
the whole economy is important and perhaps deserves more attention. This is relevant in
advanced countries too, such as the U.S., where there are concerns about the potential con-
sequences of “going soft” on competition policy, something which is likely to matter most
where there is little competition from abroad. One interesting topic for future research is
to investigate whether heavily protected tradables sectors also seem to respond to antitrust
institutions similar to non-tradables.
Our paper also contributes to the wider agenda of opening up the “black box” of in-
stitutional and policy differences. Competition policy is very specific and, while related
to other commonly used measures of institutional difference, seems to have quite specific
effects. The findings also support, therefore, for increased efforts to make competition
policy more effective.
18We have looked at whether the World Bank Doing Business indicator of the regulation of entry yields
similar results but have have found no evidence of this.
19See, for example, Autor et al. (2020) and Philippon (2019)
15
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The colonial origins of
comparative development: An empirical investigation.,” American Economic Review,
2001, 91 (5), 1369–1401.
Aghion, Philippe, Christopher Harris, Peter Howitt, and John Vickers, “Competition,
imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation,” The Review of Economic Studies,
2001, 68 (3), 467–92.
Alfaro, Laura, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger, and Andrew F. Newman, “Do prices
determine vertical integration?,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2016, 83 (3), 855–
888.
Amiti, Mary and Jozef Konings, “Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and produc-
tivity: Evidence from Indonesia,” American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (5), 1611–
1638.
Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, Gary Pisano, and Pian Shu, “For-
eign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from U.S. Patents,” American
Economic Review: Insights, 2020, Forthcoming.
Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott, “Multiproduct firms
and trade liberalization,” The Quarterly journal of Economics, 2011, 126 (3), 1271–
1318.
Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, Pillars of prosperity: The political economics of
development clusters, Princeton University Press, 2011.
Block, Michael Kent, Frederick Carl Nold, and Joseph Gregory Sidak, “The deterrent
effect of antitrust enforcement,” Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 89 (3), 429–445.
Bradford, Anu, Adam S. Chilton, Christopher Megaw, and Nathaniel Sokol, “Com-
petition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative Competition Law and Enforce-
ment Datasets,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2019, 16 (2), 411–443.
16
Covarrubias, Matias, Germa´n Gutie´rrez, and Thomas Philippon, “From Good to Bad
Concentration? U.S. Industries over the past 30 years,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2019, (w25983).
Devarajan, Shantayanan and Dani Rodrik, “Trade liberalization in developing coun-
tries: do imperfect competition and scale economies matter?,” American Economic Re-
view, 1989, 79 (2), 283–287.
Faccio, Mara and Luigi Zingales, “Political determinants of competition in the mobile
telecommunication industry,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017, (w23041).
Goldstein, Morris, Mohsin S. Khan, and Lawrence H. Officer, “Prices of tradable
and nontradable goods in the demand for total imports,” The Review of economics and
Statistics, 1980, pp. 190–199.
Grullon, Gustavo, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, “Are US industries becoming
more concentrated?,” Review of Finance, 2019, 23 (4), 697–743.
Gutie´rrez, Germa´n and Thomas Philippon, “Declining Competition and Investment in
the US,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017, (w23583).
Hylton, Keith N. and Fei Deng, “Antitrust around the world: An empirical analysis of
the scope of competition laws and their effects,” Antitrust Law Journal, 2007, 74 (2),
271–341.
Kovak, Brian K., “Regional effects of trade reform: What is the correct measure of liber-
alization?,” American Economic Review, 2013, 103 (5), 1960–76.
Krishna, Pravin and Devashish Mitra, “Trade liberalization, market discipline and pro-
ductivity growth: new evidence from India,” Journal of development Economics, 1998,
56 (2), 447–462.
Loecker, Jan De, “Product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and estimating the impact
of trade liberalization on productivity,” Econometrica, 2011, 79 (5), 1407–1451.
17
, Jan Eeckhout, and Gabriel Unger, “The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeco-
nomic Implications,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020, 135 (2), 561–644.
Mian, Atif and Amir Sufi, “What explains the 2007-2009 drop in employment?,” Econo-
metrica, 2014, 82 (6), 2197–2223.
Orbis, “Orbis - Bureau van Dijk,” Brussels, Belgium, 2016.
Pavcnik, Nina, “Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: Evidence from
Chilean plants,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2012, 69 (1), 245–276.
Philippon, Thomas, The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets, Har-
vard University Press, 2019.
Porta, Rafael La, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny,
“Law and finance,” Journal of political economy, 1998, 106 (6), 1113–1155.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions rule: the pri-
macy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development,” Journal
of economic growth, 2004, 9 (2), 131–165.
Syverson, Chad, “Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open
Questions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019, 33 (3), 24–43.
UNCTAD, “The effects of anti-competitive business practices on developing countries
and their development prospects,” United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008.
Vickers, John, “Concepts of Competition,” Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 1995,
47 (1), 1–23.
Xu, Bin, “Trade liberalization, wage inequality, and endogenously determined nontraded
goods,” Journal of International Economics, 2003, 60 (2), 417–431.
18
Tables and Graphs
19
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Sd Sd between Sd within Min Median Max
Panel A
Average Profit Margin 1,224 7.27 9.11 10.78 6.58 -18.85 5.52 50.76
Average Profit Margin (tradable) 201 5.18 6.63 6.01 3.58 -9.71 4.33 42.28
Average Profit Margin (non-tradable) 1,023 7.68 9.47 11.34 6.63 -18.85 5.76 50.76
Panel B
HHI Assets 1,245 4.73 8.91 6.51 7.39 0.00 0.97 89.31
HHI Assets (tradable) 206 4.03 8.33 9.94 4.22 0.00 1.02 88.45
HHI Assets (non-tradable) 1,039 4.87 9.02 6.42 7.47 0.00 0.96 89.31
Panel C
Tradable sector (Baseline) 1,594 0.17 0.37 0 0 1
Tradable sector (Mian and Sufi) 1,594 0.22 0.41 0 0 1
Panel D
Total Scope Index Score 1,351 21.38 4.15 8.00 22.40 27.00
Budget USD million (2006-2010) 1,198 19.20 44.09 0.00 6.19 258.12
Sample definition: The unit of analysis is a country-sector. In Panel A, C and D we use data on country-
sectors with at least 20 firms with non missing data on the average profit margin. In Panel B we consider
the country-sectors with at least 20 firms with non-missing data on Assets. All variables are averaged over
the entire sample period (2006-2015). The average profit margin and HHI Assets have been calculated after
trimming the top/bottom 1% of firms within each country-sector.
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Table 2: Main results: Profit Margin and Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Profit Margin (std) HHI assets (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.171 -0.0819 -0.103 -0.137 -0.0502 -0.135
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0512) (0.0420) (0.0411) (0.0374) (0.0202) (0.0554)
Non-tradable sector - β2 0.284
(0.0513)
Antitrust Index - β3 -0.104
(0.0535)
Antitrust Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Budget (USD) Scope Index
Tradable definition Baseline Baseline Baseline Mian and Sufi Baseline Baseline
Sample 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2010 2006-2015
Observations 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 913 1,122
R-squared 0.402 0.330 0.631 0.633 0.648 0.447
N firms 12,800,308 12,800,308 12,800,308 12,800,308 9,200,182 20,017,937
N firms non-tradable 10,515,246 10,515,246 10,515,246 10,004,777 7,432,724 17,105,026
N countries 94 94 94 94 75 97
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.28 4.49
St. Dev. Dependent variable 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.00 9.05
Country FE YES NO YES YES YES YES
Sector FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is defined as in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at a country level and
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or loss before tax and external items over operating revenue. The variable
Antitrust Index measures the intensity of antitrust activities, as defined by Hylton and Deng (2007). Both of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006
and 2015. The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable equal to one for all sectors except Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining in Column 1 to 3, 5 and 6, adding
sector J (Information and Communication) following Mian and Sufi (2014) in Column 4; see the Appendix Section A.1.1 for details. In Column (5) the antitrust measure
is the Budget in USD from Bradford et al. (2019); see Section 4 for details. Column 5 uses date only for 2006-2010 due to the limited years covered by this antitrust
policymeasure. In Column (6) the dependent variable is the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index which measures the industrial concentration based on firm assets, ranging from
0 (perfect competition) to 100 (monopoly). Country fixed effects are included in Column (1), sector fixed effects are included in Column (2), while Column (3)-(6) include
both country and sector fixed effects.
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Figure 1: Results by sector: Profit Margin
Electricity, gas, steam, air conditioning
Water supply; waste management
Construction
Wholesale, retail trade; repair vehicles
Transportation and storage
Accommodation and food service
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Financial and insurance
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PA, defence; social security
Education
Human health and social work
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Other service
Households as employers
-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2
Interacted with Scope Index
Note: This graph augments the analysis of Table 2, Column 3, by including an interaction between the
Antitrust Index and a sector dummy. We report these interactions (i.e. βs in equation 2). Excluded sectors
are the sectors in the Baseline defintion of Tradable (Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining). The sample is
defined as in Table 1, Panel A. Standard errors are clustered at a country level, we report the 95% confidence
interval. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and
external items over operating revenue. The Antitrust Index measures the intensity of antitrust activities,
according to Hylton and Deng (2007). Both of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006
and 2015. All specifications include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table 3: Institutional Indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.0784 -0.0609 0.0678 0.0701 -0.0374 -0.0323 -0.0782
Institutional Index - β1 (0.0486) (0.0550) (0.0514) (0.0494) (0.0539) (0.0581) (0.0524)
Observations 1,209 1,183 1,193 1,193 1,140 1,140 984
R-squared 0.630 0.628 0.634 0.634 0.631 0.631 0.628
N firms 13,487,883 13,487,281 13,488,237 13,488,237 13,435,159 13,435,159 13,093,172
N firms non-tradable 11,134,868 11,134,347 11,134,185 11,134,185 11,090,519 11,090,519 10,793,174
N countries 118 112 117 117 110 110 89
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 7.20 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.07 7.07 7.09
St. Dev. Dependent variable 9.02 8.89 8.89 8.89 8.84 8.84 8.88
Institutional variable: Log GDP pp Economic Freedom Civili Liberties Political Rights Polity IV Executive Constraints Rule of Law
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 3. The sample is defined in Table 1, Panel A. Standard errors are clustered at a country level
and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items over operating revenue. The
variable denoted as the Institutional Index measurues various country characteristics; see the Appendix Section A.3 for details and sources. All columns include both
country and sector fixed effects.
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Table 4: Other robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.123 -0.12 -0.0857 -0.14 -0.148 -0.149 -0.101
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0380) (0.0367) (0.0482) (0.0596) (0.0560) (0.0355) (0.0555)
Cutoff 0 50 200 20 20 20 20
Countries All All All All All All At least 19 sectors
Sample 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2015 2007 2011 2014 2006-2015
Observations 1,389 955 769 877 970 904 633
R-squared 0.541 0.688 0.697 0.692 0.582 0.633 0.646
N firms 12,802,233 12,795,362 12,775,024 5,530,434 5,990,410 6,118,058 11,583,782
N firms non-tradable 10,516,750 10,510,797 10,494,919 4,355,641 4,907,369 5,185,113 9,489,360
N countries 109 80 63 83 88 84 33
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 7.49 6.24 5.83 8.13 6.30 7.50 5.25
St. Dev. Dependent variable 9.71 8.09 7.64 8.63 7.79 7.76 6.91
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is defined as in Table 1, Panel A unless specified. We include the country-sectors
with at least 0, 50 or 200 firms with non-missing data to calculate the average profit margin in Columns 1, 2 and 3. Columns 4-6 report the results year-by-year for three
years (2007, 2011 and 2014). Column 7 restricts the sample to countries with at least 19 sectors with at least 20 firms with non-missing data to measures the average profit
margin. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items over operating revenue. The variable Antitrust Index
measures the intensity of antitrust activities, as defined by Hylton and Deng (2007). Both of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006 and 2015. The
variable non-tradable is a dummy variable equal to one for all sectors except Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. All columns include both country and sector fixed
effects. In Columns 4-6 the average profit margin is computed after trimming the top/bottom 1% of firms within each country-sector-year.
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A Online Appendix – Data Sources and Description
A.1 Orbis Dataset
We collect the universe of firms contained in Orbis (Bureau van Dijk, BvD) from 2006
to 2015.20 The Orbis dataset reports financial statements for each firm ever registered
in the each period. 21 The data includes: a unique firm identifier, country code (ISO, 2
digits), NACE Rev. 2 main section code and yearly data on operating revenue, net income,
total assets, profit margin, price earning ratio, number of employees, gross sales, net sales,
financial revenues and financial expenses.22 The profit margin is defined (see the Orbis
Handbook) as Profit/Loss before Tax and External Items over Operating Revenue (times
100).23 The original dataset contains roughly 160 million of observations. However, only
130 million of these report a sector code.
A.1.1 Sectors
We assign each firm to one sector using the NACE Rev. 2 main section code reported in
Orbis as the reference (we will refer to this as a firm’s “sector” unless otherwise speci-
fied). The list of sectors is in Appendix Table C.1. We divide sectors into tradable and
non-tradable. In the baseline, tradable sectors are: Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A),
Mining and quarrying (B) and Manufacturing (C).
Missing NACE codes If the NACE Rev. 2 main section code is missing we rely on the
following codes present in the data with the following order giving the hierarchy used in
filling the gaps:
1. NACE Rev. 2 Core code (4 digits). We convert the 4 digits NACE codes to the main
section code using the first two digits as shown in Appendix Table C.1
2. NACE Rev. 2 Primary code(s).
3. NACE Rev. 2 Secondary code(s).
20In 2015 there are only 109,043 firms with non missing profit margin. In all other years there are at least
5.5 millions
21It is not possible to distinguish firms going out of business from firms simply not reporting data
22Operating revenue, net income, total assets, gross sales, net sales, financial revenue and financial ex-
penses are reported in thousands of US Dollars. Profit margin in percentage points
23Profit/Loss before Tax and External items is the sum of Operating Profit (which is equal to Gross Profit,
i.e. Operating Revenue minus Costs of Goods Sold, minus Other Operating Expenses) and Loss with Finan-
cial Profit/Loss (which is equal to Financial Revenue minus Financial Expenses)
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4. NAICS 2012 Core code (4 digits). We map the 4 digit NAICS 2012 codes to NACE
Rev. 2 4 digits code (and then we are able to assign automatically the corresponding
NACE Rev. 2 main section). The source of the mapping tables is Eurostat. If more
than one NAICS code is assigned to more than one NACE Rev. 2 main section then
we conduct manual checks.
5. NAICS 2012 Primary code(s).
6. NAICS 2012 Secondary code(s).
7. US SIC Core code (3 digits). We map the 3 digits US SIC codes (1987 version) to
NAICS 2007 codes and then to NAICS 2012 codes (above mapping then applies).
Source: US Census. Going through the NAICS codes is necessary as a direct map-
ping from US SIC to NACE Rev. 2 does not exist. Manual checks were also carried
on here to ensure that to each US SIC code only one NACE Rev. 2 main section
8. US SIC Primary code(s).
9. US SIC Secondary code(s).
Creating a unique NACE code By construction, the original dataset has repeated obser-
vations for the same firm whenever the firm operates in more than one sector (either it was
a main, primary, or secondary sector). Most of the time, the only information that varies
is the sector code reported while data from financial statements are constant. Having con-
verted everything, we delete duplicates in NACE Rev. 2 main section. However, some
duplicates may remain whenever different NACE Rev. 2 main section codes are reported.
As a first step, we look at which sector represents the biggest share of sales. If there are
duplicates (mainly due to missing information on sales), we keep the observation with the
smallest number of missing observations in the financial statements. If this procedure does
not resolve all cases of duplication, we randomly select among the duplicated codes for
that observation.
The Mian and Sufi division between tradable and non-tradable sectors As a robust-
ness check in Table 2, following Mian and Sufi (2014), we also include Information and
communication (J) among the tradable sectors (the Mian and Sufi definition).Mian and
Sufi (2014) classify 294 4 digit 2012 NAICS industry codes as non-tradable, tradable,
construction or other industries. They also report the percentage of the entire 2007 US
labour force represented by each industry. We match the 2012 NAICS 4 digits code to
NACE Rev. 2 4 digit codes and sum tradable and total labour force by NACE Rev. 2 main
section code. We compute the relative share of tradable within each NACE Rev. 2 main
section code. Sectors A, B, C, J are the only four sectors with positive shares of the labor
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force in tradable sectors according to the Mian and Sufi (2014) definition (6.3%, 60%,
86% and 7.2% respectively). Computing the number of industries classified as“tradable”
in each NACE Rev. 2 main section code deliver similar results. In particular: 25% of
industries in code A, 80% of code B, 87% of code C, 5.9% of code J are categorized as
tradable by Mian and Sufi (2014).
Data Cleaning The original data contains some extreme outliers. We therefore used a
trimmed version of all variables. Specifically, we trimmed the top and bottom 1%.24 This
trimming exercise is performed at a country-sector level in the main sample.
A.1.2 The cross-section sample
The unit of analysis is a country-sector. For the main analysis, we use the average profit
margin constructed by taking the average profit margin of all firms in a country-sector over
a ten year window. In this exercise, trimming is performed at a country-sector level. We
refer to this as the mean concentration measure.
To ensure that these concentration measures are representative of the country-sector
firm composition, we require a minimum number of observations for the relevant country-
sector for it to be included in the data. The baseline cutoff is at 20. However, as a
robustness check we also consider 0 (i.e. no restriction at all), 10, 30, 40, 50, 200 or 3000
firms per country-sector.25 The baseline cross sectional sample at a country-sector level
represents around 13 million firm-level observations.26
Appendix Figure C.1 reports the number of firms with non-missing profit margin data
disaggregated by continent. This shows that most of our firms are not coming from de-
veloped countries. We have a significant number of firms located in Asia, Eastern Europe
and Latin America, and relatively few, from North America.
Appendix Figure C.2 reports the number of firms in each sector. This shows the impor-
tance of focusing firms outside manufacturing, in contrast to much work on level behavior.
We will also be exploiting data from some large sectors such as retail and construction.
Appendix Figure C.3 reports the total number of sectors available for each country
averaged by continent when we use our requirement of at least 20 firms per country-sector.
It shows that 58 (out of 123) countries have more than 10 sectors with more than 20 firms.
Most of them are in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North America. This graph,
24Results not trimmed and trimming top and bottom 5% are presented as robustness in Appendix Table
D.8, no differences arise
25As we first compute the average of firms balance sheets it means that we will need at least 20 firms to
have at least one balance sheet data reported in the ten years period
26Just to recall all the restrictions imposed: we drop all firms not reporting any sector code, we drop all
the firms in the top/bottom 1% of the distribution of the variable of interest (e.g. profit margin, assets, ...) at
country-sector, we drop all firms not part of a country-sector reporting data for the variable of interest for at
least 20 firms
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combined with Appendix Figure C.1, suggests that some countries (i.e. look for example
at Latin America) may have many firms reported, but most of them will come from the
same sectors, rather than being spread equally among many.
Appendix Figure C.4 reports the percentage of country-sectors with more than 20
firms. It shows that almost every country has at least 20 firms in the Financial and In-
surance sector. In addition, 10 sectors (out of 21) have more than 50% of our sample
countries represented.
Alternative Aggregation As an alternative way of aggregating the data, we compute
each concentration measure at a country-sector-year level before averaging over the ten
years (we will call this variable the average concentration measure). Results using this al-
ternative aggregation approach (or yearly concentration measures) are similar to the base-
line as we show in Appendix Tables D.4 and D.5 below. 27
The HHI Index as a Measure of Concentration We have also computed Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each country-sector using the total assets and gross or net
sales from Orbis. We prefer to use HHI based on total assets for two main reasons: i)
when looking at non-tradable sectors, it is not at all straightforward how to consider sales
and ii) the sales variables in Orbis contain many missing observations. To mitigate this
problem we have tried imputing gross (or net) sales based on the relationship between this
variable and total assets. Specifically, we regress gross sales on total assets, sector fixed
effects and country×year fixed effects (or at country fixed effects when we predict values
of averages over ten years). Predicted values are then imputed only if the original variable
(gross sales in the example) is missing. Negative predicted values are also excluded.
Capturing Entry and Exit In the original Orbis dataset, we are unable to observe entry
and exit. Specifically, we cannot distinguish whether missing values are due to firm not
yet existing/ceasing to exist. We therefore proceed as follows:
We define entry in the following way: a firm enters in year t if we start observing data
from the financial statement in year t. We apply this procedure for the 2008-2015 period28.
We define exit in the following way: a firm exits our sample in year t if we do not
observe data from the financial statement in any of the following years. We apply this
procedure for the 2006-2012 period.29
27Defining the cutoff to have the country-sector included in the sample, is straightforward: we include the
country-sectors with a number of observations greater than or equal to the cutoff. If we consider the average
of these yearly concentration measures we compute the average number of firms used to compute the yearly
concentration measures. Trimming top and bottom 1% is performed at country-sector-year
28Applying the same procedure in 2006, first year of data, and 2007 may result in wrong entry assignments
29Applying the same procedure in 2013-2015 may result in wrong exit assignments. We exclude three
years when looking at firm exit because 2015 reports a substantially lower number of firms
28
Since we are only interested in firms reporting data, we follow these procedures before
trimming the variables in the data from financial statements. We compute the share of firms
entering (exiting) for each year-contry-sector over the total number of firms in the country-
sector. Finally, we compute the average entry (exit) share of firms for each country-sector.
In the analysis, we restrict to country-sectors with at least 20 firms reporting data from
their financial statements.
A.2 The Antitrust Measure
We use the Total Scope Index Score (Scope Index) from Hylton and Deng (2007).30 They
code antitrust laws and policies around the world (112 countries in the most recent version)
in order to create a metric of antitrust laws. This is constructed by examining various
components of competition law and assign a score depending how national laws govern
conduct, penalties or enforcement.31 The total index score is the sum of the scores for
each sub-category. The minimum value is 0 while the maximum is 30. This is mainly a
de jure index and does not measure the effectiveness of these laws. Section II of Hylton
and Deng (2007) discusses the methodology at length. 32 We average the index of our ten
year period (2006-2015).
Figure C.5 shows the geographical distribution of this index.
It gives a sense of the country coverage and areas of the world where antitrust laws are
rated to be stronger or weaker. There are notable countries without data, including most
of sub-saharan Africa.
We show in the Appendix Table C.2, that the antitrust index is correlated in a common
sense way with a range of variables which represent the quality of institutions. Specifically,
we run the following regression:
Ac = α + χZc + εc (4)
where Ac is the Total Scope Index Score of Hylton and Deng (2007) and Zc is variously:
log of GDP per capita, the Economic Freedom, Civil Liberties and Political Rights Indices
30The most up to date dataset can be found here.
31Categories considered Territorial Scope, Remedies, Private Enforcement, Merger Notification, Merger
Assessment, Dominance, and Restrictive Trade Practices.
32A special case is represented by Europe. Hylton and Deng (2007) present both regulation from the
European Commission and for each country member of the EU, reporting the national antitrust law and the
national antitrust law integrated with EU regulation. We ignored the purely European Commission law and
whenever there was a conflict between purely national and national with EU regulation antitrust law (i.e.
both reported in the same year) we had the latter to dominate. We consider measures of European-wide
Antitrust policies in Appendix Table D.5, in which we consider the European Union to a single country with
similar results to our baseline specification.
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from Freedom House, the democracy and executive constraints measures from PolityIV,
and the Rule of Law Index from the World Justice Project. Appendix Table C.2 shows that
countries with higher GDP are classified, on average, as having a better antitrust regime
according to Hylton and Deng (2007). The index is positively correlated with economic
freedom but negatively correlated with political and civil rights. Countries that are more
democratic and have stronger executive constraints also have a higher score on the antitrust
index. And stronger rule of law is positively correlated with the index. Although these
are not causal relationships, it suggest that there are important sources of country-level
unobserved heterogeneity that are likely to affect the antitrust regime, thereby reinforcing
the need to include country fixed effects in all our regressions.
To supplement this index, we use Bradford et al. (2019) to measure the budget (in USD)
allocated by each country for antitrust agencies as an alternative measure for antitrust
policies. This is available only up to 2010. However, we will use it alongside the scope
index as robustness check in Table 2. To ensure a valid comparison with other results, we
will average the concentration index measures over the period 2006-2010.
We also run the analysis using the Competition Law Index (CLI) from Bradford and
Chilton (2018). This is similar to the Scope Index and covers a larger group of countries.
However, it is also only available up to 2010. Results (available upon request) show a
negative, although insignificant correlation between this and our measure of profitability
in a specification similar to column (3) of Table 2. To ensure a valid comparison we
average the concentration index measure only over the period 2006-2010 when we do this.
In an effort to capture the effectiveness of antitrust policies we looked at the yearly
Global Competitiveness Report from World Economic Forum. We particularly focus the
Executive Opinion Survey question which asks respondents: ”In your country, to what
extent does anti-monopoly policy promote competition?” where the answer can be from
1 (does not promote competition) to 7 (effectively promotes competition).33 We compute
an average for this variable over the ten years period of analysis (2006-2015). Results
(available upon request) show a negative, although insignificant, correlation in our main
specification akin to Column (3) of Table 2 when using this alternative indicator of antitrust
policy.
A.3 Other variables
We have also collected a range of country-level variables to use in our analysis: GDP
per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $), (source: World Bank); Summary index of
Economic Freedom of the World, (source: Fraser Institute); Civil Liberties Index and Po-
litical Rights Index, (source Freedom House); Polity IV and Executive Constraints Index,
33Nicholson (2008) looks at the relationship between this De Facto measure and Hylton and Deng (2007)
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(source: Centre for Systemic Peace); Overall score among Rule of Law, (source: World
Justice Project). For all these variables we compute the average over the ten years period
of analysis (2006-2015).34
A.4 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics on the distribution of profitability, concentration, and the antitrust in-
dex are given in Table 1. This shows how these variables vary within country across sector
and across country within sector. Panel A gives the average profit margin both overall
and disaggregated using our tradable/non-tradable distinction. The average profit margin
in non-tradable sectors is higher with a mean of 7.58 (standard deviation 9.47) compared
to a mean of 5.18 (standard deviation 6.63) for the tradable sectors. These raw data are
consistent with Hypothesis 1 based on the idea that tradable sectors are more exposed to
international trade. The between country variation is somewhat greater than the within
country variation suggesting that country-specific factors are at work in determining these
differences. Panel B shows that the HHI measure based on assets is also higher on aver-
age for the non-tradable sectors. It is 4.87 (standard deviation 9.02) for the non-tradable
sectors while for the tradable sectors it is 4.03 (standard deviation 8.83).
In Panel C, we give the fraction of firms in our sample that are operating in the tradable
sectors according to our baseline definition and that used in Mian and Sufi (2014). Our
definition suggests that 17% of firms are in the tradables sector while for the Mian and Sufi
(2014) definition, it is 22%. Either way, this reinforces the point that most firms are not
exposed to international trade and that looking at the competitive impact of trade therefore
gives only a very partial picture of factors driving firm performance and profitability.
In Panel C, we give the fraction of country-sectors in our sample that are classified
as tradable according to our baseline definition and that used in Mian and Sufi (2014).
Our definition suggests that 17% of country-sector observations are in the tradables sector
while for the Mian and Sufi (2014) definition, it is 22%. Summary statistics in Table 2
are consistent with our sample being composed by 10.5 million firms operating in the
non-tradable sector out of a total of 12.8 millions firms. It means that tradable sectors
represents 17.9% (21.8% using the Mian and Sufi (2014) definition) of our sample. We
conclude that most firms are not exposed to international trade and that looking at the
competitive impact of trade therefore gives only a very partial picture of factors driving
firm performance and profitability.
Finally, in Panel D, we report the means and standard deviations of our two core an-
titrust variables. The wide range of differences in the expenditure measure are particularly
striking.
34With the exception of Rule of Law index available only in 2012, 2014 and 2015
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Appendix Table C.3 presents summary statistics for additional key variables used in
the analysis. HHI gross sales and HHI net sales have been computed after trimming the
variable of interest in the sample at 1% at country× sector level. We are also restricting the
sample to country-sectors with at least 20 firms reporting data in the variable of interest. In
Panel B, we restrict the attention to country-sectors with at least 20 firms reporting average
profit margin.
B Online Appendix – Additional Results and Robustness
In this section, we present some additional results and a range of robustness checks.
Entry and exit We investigate one of the many possible mechanisms behind the neg-
ative relationship between antitrust, profits, and concentration. Our main hypothesis is
that antitrust policy may induce competition by lowering the regulatory burden and fixed
costs. A corollary of this may imply that antitrust induces a differentially positive ef-
fect on entry and exit in non-tradable sectors compared to tradable ones. As a result,
the following equation verifies whether antitrust is associated with the firm entry and exit
(measured as described in Appendix, section A.1.2). We regress Entrycs, which measures
the average entry of firms in country c and sector s on an interaction between the antitrust
index, Antitrustc, and the dummy taking unit value for sectors classified as non-tradable,
Non− Tradables, including country and sector fixed effects. The same regression is also
presented for the average share of exiting firms:
Entrycs = β1Antitrustc ×Non− Tradables + δc + σs + cs. (5)
Column (1) of Appendix Table D.1 shows that one standard deviation higher antitrust
index is associated with a 6.78 percent increase in the standard deviation of the share of
firms entering in country c and sector s. This is statistically significant, corresponding to
an increase of 2.2% relative to the mean. Changes in antitrust policy do not correlate well
with the exit of firms, as shown in Column (2). This is true both in terms of significance and
the point estimate is an order of magnitude smaller than for entry. The finding in Column
(1) is consistent with antitrust policy lowering barriers to entry, which may increase the
likelihood of new firms entering (or existing firms growing in size). At the same time,
the lack of response on exit is in line with antitrust policy leading to lower profits, but
insufficiently so to drive firms from the market.
Alternative HHI We consider alternative concentration measures and verify their ro-
bustness with our main results. Column (6) of Table 2 shows that the HHI based on assets,
is negatively correlated with the antitrust in non-tradable sectors. We repeat this analysis
in Appendix Table D.2 by using two different concentration measures: a) the HHI based
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on gross sales in Column (1) and b) the HHI using net sales in Column (2). The results of
Appendix Table D.2 are in line with Table 2 both in terms of sign and magnitude.
Cutoff We modify the sample threshold defining our sample as we did in Table 4,
Columns 1-3. In Section 5 of the paper, we considered only country-sector cells con-
taining at least 20 firms and disregard all country-sector cells with a smaller number of
firms. This generates comparable cells across countries and sectors. Appendix Table D.3
replicates our baseline specification presented in the Column (3) of Table 2, including
country and sector fixed effects and only changes the minimum number of firms necessary
to include a country-sector cell with cutoffs between 0 and 3000 firms. The results in all
columns are statistically indistinguishable from those in Table 2. The loss of statistical
significance in columns further to the right is most likely related to power issues.
Alternative samples We show that our results are robust to different sampling strategies
as we did in Table 4, Columns 4-6. Appendix Tables D.4 and D.5 explore the specification
presented in Column (3) of Table 2 on the sample for the years 2006-2015. In Column (1),
we verify that our main result is unaffected if we change the timing of our sample and take
the average profit margin over the 2006-2010 period to make it comparable with column
(5) of Table 2. Column (2) shows that our main result is unchanged if we analyze the
average of yearly average profit margin at country-sector level, rather than first averaging
profit margin for each firm over the ten years and then average by country-sector. We
then repeat the analysis by defining our sample as the mean over a single year and verify
that the results are statistically indistinguishable from the core results. Hence, Columns
(3) to (8) of Appendix Table D.4 report our main result for single years: from 2006 to
2011. Appendix Table D.5 reports the same coefficients in a year-by-year fashion from
2012 until 2015 in Columns (1) to (4). The latter is the only year that shows a marginally
insignificant estimate, but with a much smaller sample: the number of country-sector cells
in 2015 is 167, compared to roughly 900 for all other years, and around 1.5% of the firms
reporting data, compared to other years.
To ensure that including 2015 does not alter our results, we look at Column (3) of Table
2 for the years 2006-2014. The results are identical.
We now allow the EU to be treated as a single country; the results are in Appendix Ta-
ble D.5. Here, we calculate the average profit margin (and the HHI index) treating all EU
countries as a single country. The countries considered in the EU in 2006 (the first year of
data) are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Greece, Malta, Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Bulgaria and Romania
(which joined in 2007) and Croatia (which joined in 2013) are excluded. Columns (6),
(7) and (8) replicate the specifications in Columns (3), (5) and (6) of Table 2. The basic
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findings are robust to aggregating the EU into a single entity. However, the coefficient in
Column (6) is not significant although we cannot reject the coefficient being the same as
Column (3) in Table 2. In addition to the results shown, we averaged (weighting by size
of country-sector) each country-sector within EU (both for our antitrust indexes and the
concentration measures) and the results are almost identical.
Weighting Profit Margin by Operating Revenues This sub-section shows that our re-
sults are almost identical if, when computing the average profit margin at country-sector,
we consider a weighted average by operating revenues instead of the simple average. Re-
sults are shown in Appendix Table D.6 in which we replicate Columns (1) to (5) of Table
2. Only Column (5) is not significant although we cannot reject the coefficient being the
same as Column (5) in Table 2. All the other coefficients of interest are very similar and,
if anything, larger.
Data quality Here we explore whether our results depend on the poor data quality of
some countries. Column (7) of Table 4 offers one important robustness check: it restricts
the sample to countries that have at least 19 sectors with sufficient data to be included
(where 20 is the maximum number of sectors possible). This serves as a check on data
quality since some countries may have limited data in Orbis which leads to the exclusion
of entire sectors. We now verify that this is not a problem in our setting. Appendix Table
D.7 shows a further robustness check based on Column (7) of Table 4 when the minimum
number of sectors per country is varied from 5 to 20. The point estimate is unchanged
as this threshold moves from 5 in Column (1), to 10 in (2), to 15 in (3) and to 20 in (4).
As in previous tests, a higher threshold leads to a small number of observations and firms,
weakening the statistical precision but leaving the point estimate unchanged.
Various robustness Additional robustness checks are in Appendix Table D.8. Column
(1) presents results from a weighted regression, with the weight given by the number of
firms in the country-sector with a non-missing profit margin35. The next two columns
consider different “trimming” strategies. In our baseline estimates, we had trimmed the
top and bottom 1% of firms, in line with much of the literature that uses Orbis data. Our
findings are robust to not doing any trimming (Column (2)) and to more restrictive trim-
ming at 5% in Column (3). In Column (4), we also verify that our results are robust to
a different way of trimming by removing the top/bottom 1% of concentration measures.
Columns (5) and (6) vary the way in which we cluster our standard errors. Column (5) has
unadjusted standard errors and Column (6) clusters at a country-sector level (equivalent to
robust standard errors).
35In this case we want to give more relavance to country-sectors with more firms represented. This is
different from what we do in Appendix Table D.6 where we are giving more weight to larger firms when
computing average profit margin at country-sector level.
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C Online Appendix – Additional Tables and Figures
35
Table C.1: Nace Revision 2 codes
Main section Description 2 digits
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01 – 03
B Mining and quarrying 05 – 09
C Manufacturing 10 – 33
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 35
E
Water supply; sewerage,
36 – 39
waste management and remediation activities
F Construction 41 – 43
G
Wholesale and retail trade;
45 – 47
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H Transportation and storage 49 – 53
I Accommodation and food service activities 55 – 56
J Information and communication 58 – 63
K Financial and insurance activities 64 – 66
L Real estate activities 68
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 69 – 75
N Administrative and support service activities 77 – 82
O
Public administration and defence;
84
compulsory social security
P Education 85
Q Human health and social work activities 86 – 88
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 90 – 93
S Other service activities 94 – 96
T
Activities of households as employers;
97 – 98undifferentiated goods and services
producing activities of households for own use
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 99
Note: We report Level 1 Sectors in NACE Rev 2
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Figure C.1: Number of firms by continent
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Note: Number of firms with non-missing profit margin in at least one of the ten years of sample period
(2006-2015) by continent. The sample is as defined in Table 1, Panel A.
Figure C.2: Number of firms by sector
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Note: Number of firms with non-missing profit margin data in at least one of the ten years of sample period
(2006-2015) by sector. The sample is as defined in Table 1, Panel A.
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Figure C.3: Average number of sectors by continent
0 5 10 15 20
Average number of sectors in each country
Western Europe
Oceania
North America
Middle East
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Asia
Africa
Number of sectors is 20
Note: Average number of sectors in each country averaged by continent. Sample defined as in Table 1, Panel
A.
Figure C.4: Percentage of countries with at least 20 firms in the sector
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Number of countries is 123
Note: Percentage of countries in each sector. Sample defined as in Table 1, Panel A.
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Table C.2: Antitrust Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Antitrust Index (std)
Institutional Index - χ 0.434 0.248 -0.374 -0.326 0.243 0.303 0.353
(0.121) (0.117) (0.109) (0.101) (0.107) (0.110) (0.106)
Observations 107 106 108 108 104 104 83
R-squared 0.132 0.053 0.120 0.096 0.048 0.071 0.125
N countries 107 106 108 108 104 104 83
Mean dependent variable 20.06 19.99 20.17 20.17 20.11 20.11 20.29
St. Dev. Dependent variable 4.66 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.69 4.69 4.78
Institutional variable: Log GDP pp Economic Freedom Civili Liberties Political Rights Polity IV Executive Constraints Rule of Law
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 4. Standard errors are robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable Antitrust Index is an index measuring the intensity of antitrust activities, as defined by Hylton and Deng (2007). The Institutional Index variable represents various
country characteristics, see Appendix Section A.3 for details and sources.
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Figure C.5: Geographical distribution Scope Index (average 2006-2015)
Note: The geographical distribution Scope Index (averaged for the period 2006-2015). The red areas repre-
sent a low value of the antitrust index (minimum equals to 5) while the green areas represent a high value of
the antitrust index (maximum equals to 27). We do not have data for grey areas.
40
Table C.3: Additional Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Sd Min Median Max
Panel A
Number of firms reporting profit margin 1,224 11,023 40,800 20 785 906,758
Number of firms reporting total assets 1,245 16,645 54,686 20 1077 977,687
HHI Gross Sales 1,115 3.56 6.40 0.00 0.47 78.71
Number of firms reporting gross sales 1,115 10,105 34,323 20 568 604,246
HHI Net Sales 1,116 3.56 6.38 0.00 0.46 78.71
Number of firms reporting net sales 1,116 10,186 35,324 20 570 656,511
Pct new firm 1,623 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.13
Pct closed firm 1,592 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.14
Panel B
GDP per capita 1,545 25,462 18,679 637 20814 121,724
Economic Freedom 1,476 7.10 0.76 3.91 7.23 9.03
Civili Liberties 1,548 2.56 1.68 1.00 2.00 7.00
Political Rights 1,548 2.64 1.96 1.00 2.00 7.00
Polity IV 1,477 16.19 5.55 0.00 19.00 20.00
Executive Constraints 1,477 5.86 1.67 1.00 7.00 7.00
Rule of Law (2012, 2014, 2015) 1,233 0.62 0.14 0.33 0.58 0.88
Note: The unit of analysis is country-sector. In Panel A we consider the country-sectors with at least 20
firms with non missing financial statements data to compute the variable of interest. Panel B considers the
country-sectors with at least 20 firms with non missing average profit margin. All variables are averaged
over the entire sample period (2006-2015). HHI Gross Sales and HHI Net Sales have been computed after
trimming the sample at 1% at country-sector level. Net or gross sales present many missing values, we
predict non-negative missing values using total assets, sector fixed effect, and the interaction term between
sector and total total assets, looking separately at each country.
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Table D.1: Entry and Exit
(1) (2)
Pct new firm Pct closed firm
Non-tradable sector x 0.0678 -0.00196
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0305) (0.0224)
Observations 1,367 1,351
R-squared 0.850 0.888
N firms 54,993,643 48,119,148
N firms non-tradable 47,385,227 41,461,838
N countries 100 99
N sectors 20 20
Mean dependent variable 0.09 0.04
St. Dev. Dependent variable 0.03 0.04
Country FE YES YES
Sector FE YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1, where the unit of observation is
a country-sector cell, and the country-sectors contain at least 20 firms with non-missing financial statements
data. Standard errors are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable,
Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items over operating revenue.
The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable taking
the value one for all sectors other than Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. All coumns include both
country and sector fixed effects.
D Online Appendix – Additional Results and Robustness
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Table D.2: Alternative HHI indexes
(1) (2)
HHI Gross Sales HHI Net Sales
Non-tradable sector x -0.099 -0.103
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0575) (0.0554)
Observations 1,006 1,008
R-squared 0.366 0.367
N firms 11,136,415 11,236,380
N firms non-tradable 9,589,379 9,668,482
N countries 89 89
N sectors 20 20
Mean dependent variable 3.23 3.25
St. Dev. Dependent variable 6.17 6.18
Country FE YES YES
Sector FE YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in
Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at country level and reported in
parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and
external items over operating revenue. The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). The variable
non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than Agriculture, Manufacturing
and Mining. The variable Herfindahl - Hirschman Index (HHI) is an index measuring the concentration
of an industry based on firm net sales (Column 1) or gross sales (Column 2), it ranges between 0 (perfect
competition) and 100 (monopoly). All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.3: Alternative cutoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.123 -0.101 -0.115 -0.132 -0.12 -0.0857 -0.0614
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0380) (0.0443) (0.0423) (0.0408) (0.0367) (0.0482) (0.0545)
Cutoff 0 10 30 40 50 200 3000
Observations 1,389 1,193 1,041 994 955 769 394
R-squared 0.541 0.618 0.671 0.679 0.688 0.697 0.761
N firms 12,802,233 12,801,449 12,798,690 12,797,083 12,795,362 12,775,024 12,382,718
N firms non-tradable 10,516,750 10,516,129 10,513,853 10,512,348 10,510,797 10,494,919 10,168,878
N countries 109 104 88 83 80 63 40
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20 19
Mean dependent variable 7.49 7.05 6.70 6.50 6.24 5.83 5.78
St. Dev. Dependent variable 9.71 8.78 8.27 8.23 8.09 7.64 7.82
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in Table 1, Panel A unless otherwise specified. Standard errors
are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items
over operating revenue. The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than
Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. We consider the country-sectors with at least 0, 10, 30, 40, 50, 200 or 3000 firms with non-missing data for the average profit
margin in Columns 1 to 7. All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.4: Alternative samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.153 -0.129 -0.0676 -0.14 -0.152 -0.0858 -0.188 -0.148
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0397) (0.0356) (0.0398) (0.0596) (0.0632) (0.0449) (0.0423) (0.0560)
Sample Mean 2006-2010 Average 2006-2015 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Observations 1,000 954 845 877 904 923 952 970
R-squared 0.655 0.655 0.682 0.692 0.627 0.647 0.656 0.582
N firms 8,998,328 5,343,366 5,104,345 5,530,434 5,690,555 5,723,592 5,634,093 5,990,410
N firms non-tradable 7,216,377 4,347,578 4,016,206 4,355,641 4,434,258 4,549,090 4,728,485 4,907,369
N countries 89 83 81 83 84 85 86 88
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.62 6.73 7.47 8.13 6.24 5.53 6.65 6.30
St. Dev. Dependent variable 8.34 7.35 8.28 8.63 7.78 8.22 8.11 7.79
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. Standard errors
are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items
over operating revenue. The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than
Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining.
In Column 1 we consider average profit margin over 2006-2010 period. In Column 2 we first take the average by year and then average by country-sector. Columns
3-8 report the results year by year for 2006-2011. In Columns 2-8 average profit margin has been computed after trimming the top/bottom 1% of firms within each
country-sector-year. All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.5: Alternative samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Profit Margin (std) HHI assets (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.135 -0.118 -0.149 -0.185 -0.103 -0.0464 -0.0936 -0.15
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0478) (0.0437) (0.0355) (0.110) (0.0411) (0.0489) (0.0238) (0.0786)
Sample 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 2006-2014 EU unique EU unique EU unique
Antitrust Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Budget (USD) Scope Index
Observations 996 995 904 168 1,110 696 551 704
R-squared 0.632 0.638 0.633 0.682 0.629 0.638 0.669 0.448
N firms 6,631,818 6,923,192 6,118,058 90,270 12,793,410 12,800,468 9,305,869 20,018,149
N firms non-tradable 5,478,139 5,743,993 5,185,113 80,217 10,508,781 10,515,350 7,516,707 17,105,174
N countries 88 88 84 25 94 71 55 74
N sectors 20 20 20 19 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.52 7.03 7.50 10.20 6.80 7.89 7.40 5.66
St. Dev. Dependent variable 8.04 8.08 7.76 9.07 8.53 9.30 8.80 9.50
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. Standard errors
are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items
over operating revenue. The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). Both of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006 and 2015. The variable
non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. Columns 1-4 report the results year by year for
the period 2012-2015, where the average profit margin has been calculated after trimming the top/bottom 1% of firms within each country-sector-year. In Column 5, we
the average profit margin is for the period 2006-2014. In Columns 6-8, all the countries member of European Union in 2006 are treated as a single country. In Column
7, antitrust index is Budget in USD as defined in Bradford et al. (2019) (see Section 4 for details) and covers the period 2006-2010. In Column 8, the dependent variable
is the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index (HHI) measuring the concentration of an industry based on firm assets, ranging from 0 (perfect competition) to 100 (monopoly). All
columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.6: Weighting Profit Margin by Operating Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.219 -0.0768 -0.151 -0.157 -0.0290
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0676) (0.0640) (0.0593) (0.0511) (0.0447)
Non-tradable sector - β2 0.0814
(0.0730)
Antitrust Index - β3 -0.169
(0.0635)
Antitrust Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Scope Index Budget (USD)
Tradable definition Baseline Baseline Baseline Mian and Sufi Baseline
Sample 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2015 2006-2010
Observations 1,066 1,066 1,066 1,066 889
R-squared 0.314 0.376 0.540 0.541 0.547
N firms 12,330,345 12,330,345 12,330,345 12,330,345 8,892,370
N firms non-tradable 10,115,761 10,115,761 10,115,761 9,622,786 7,169,720
N countries 93 93 93 93 75
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.33
St. Dev. Dependent variable 7.26 7.26 7.26 7.26 7.18
Country FE YES NO YES YES YES
Sector FE NO YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are
clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items over
operating revenue. When aggregating at country-sector we weight firms’ profit margin by operating revenues. The Antitrust Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). Both
of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006 and 2015. The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than
Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.7: Restricting number of sectors per country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.103 -0.103 -0.105 -0.0800
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0458) (0.0514) (0.0597) (0.0469)
Number of sectors per country 5 10 15 20
Observations 1,065 1,004 909 120
R-squared 0.616 0.624 0.626 0.779
N firms 12,797,276 12,791,836 12,772,003 5,200,463
N firms non-tradable 10,513,150 10,509,322 10,496,408 4,585,427
N countries 65 57 49 6
N sectors 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.42 5.98 5.72 7.47
St. Dev. Dependent variable 8.21 7.69 7.41 8.07
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents OLS estimates using the specification in equation 1. The sample is as defined in
Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. In Columns 1 to 4, we consider those countries with at least
5, 10, 15 or 20 sectors and with at least 20 firms with non-missing average profit margin data. Standard
errors are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable, Profit Margin, is
defined by Orbis as the profit or losses before tax and external items over operating revenue. The Antitrust
Index is from Hylton and Deng (2007). Both of these variables are standardized and averaged between 2006
and 2015. The variable non-tradable is a dummy variable taking the value one for all sectors other than
Agriculture, Manufacturing and Mining. All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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Table D.8: Other robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Profit Margin (std)
Non-tradable sector x -0.105 -0.105 -0.122 -0.0956 -0.103 -0.103
Antitrust Index - β1 (0.0528) (0.0385) (0.0408) (0.0406) (0.0466) (0.0380)
Observations 1,110 1,123 1,087 1,089 1,110 1,110
R-squared 0.797 0.647 0.639 0.651 0.631 0.631
N firms 12,800,308 13,132,056 11,783,874 12,701,900 12,800,308 12,800,308
N firms non-tradable 10,515,246 10,793,295 9,683,463 10,420,144 10,515,246 10,515,246
N countries 94 96 91 94 94 94
N sectors 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean dependent variable 6.80 7.09 6.74 6.78 6.80 6.80
St. Dev. Dependent variable 8.53 8.92 8.32 7.79 8.53 8.53
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cutoff 20 20 20 20 20 20
Tradable definition Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual
Sample Mean 2006-2015 Mean 2006-2015 Mean 2006-2015 Mean 2006-2015 Mean 2006-2015 Mean 2006-2015
Weighted Yes No No No No No
Trim at firm level 1% No 5% 1% 1% 1%
Trim at concentration measure level No No No 1% No No
Standard errors Cluster Country Cluster Country Cluster Country Cluster Country OLS Cluster Country-Sector
Note: This table presents OLS estimates from equation 1. The sample defined as in Table 1 Panel A, unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at country
level and reported in parentheses. Column 1 reports the result from a weighted regression where the weights are the number of firms in each country-sector with not missing
profit margin. In Column 2, we do not trim our data. In Column 3, we trim top/bottom 5% firms based on average profit margin distribution within each country-sector
level. In Column 4, we trim top/bottom 1% country-sectors based on average profit margin. In Column 5, we do not adjust standard errors. In Column 6, we consider
standard errors clustered at country-sector level (i.e. Robust standard errors. Unless otherwise specified, all columns report the same specification as in Column 3 of Table
2. All columns include both country and sector fixed effects.
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